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Abstract: In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving scheme for targeted advertising via the Internet Protocol TV
(IPTV). The scheme uses a communication model involving a collection of viewers/subscribers, a content
provider (IPTV), an advertiser, and a cloud server. To provide high quality directed advertising service, the
advertiser can utilize not only demographic information of subscribers, but also their watching habits. The
latter includes watching history, preferences for IPTV content and watching rate, which are published on the
cloud server periodically (e.g. weekly) along with anonymized demographics. Since the published data may
leak sensitive information about subscribers, it is safeguarded using cryptographic techniques in addition to
the anonymization of demographics. The techniques used by the advertiser, which can be manifested in its
queries to the cloud, are considered (trade) secrets and therefore are protected as well. The cloud is oblivious
to the published data, the queries of the advertiser as well as its own responses to these queries. Only a
legitimate advertiser, endorsed with a so-called trapdoor by the IPTV, can query the cloud and utilize the
query results. The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated with experiments, which show that the
scheme is suitable for practical usage.
1 INTRODUCTION
Literature suggests (Kodialam et al., 2010) that con-
tent targeting (e.g. advertisement to customers) is po-
tentially a huge and lucrative business. Traditional
media such as TV, radio, or newspaper can do only a
little to customize advertisements of products or ser-
vices for their customers. It is claimed (Min and
Cheong, 2009) that sponsors are more interested in
sending advertisements of their products to prospec-
tive customers with high accuracy. Online media of-
fers better opportunities for targeting prospective cus-
tomers by utilizing customers online history, observed
behavior, and demographics. Therefore advertisem-
nets selcted on the basis of online traits and demo-
graphics of individuals are preferred by advertising
agencies aiming to increase the benefit from adver-
tisement. However, a major issue is the potential vio-
lation of the privacy of individuals.
It appears as if IPTV is becoming a preferred on-
line media with potentially millions of subscribers.
Thus, IPTV is a hot spot for advertising agencies that
have the incentives to utilize the data that IPTV col-
lects about its subscribers. As in many other areas
the data collected by IPTV is accumulating over time
and therefore there is a motivation to outsource data
warehousing to a cloud service. Such outsourcing can
decrease cost by mitigating the burdens of storage,
service management and expenditure on hardware or
software (Armbrust et al., 2009).
The media attention given to cloud computing
suggests that it is gaining a considerable attention
in business environments allowing their customers to
store and access data remotely. Sensitive data such
as personal health records, private videos and pho-
tos, email etc. can also be stored on cloud servers.
It is suggested to encrypt data before outsourcing
to protect the privacy of data and prevent unautho-
rized access to data in the cloud (Kamara and Lauter,
2010). However, by encrypting data, one of the key
functionalities of database systems, i.e. keyword-
based search operation, becomes a challenging is-
sue. Remote querying of encrypted databases on ex-
ternal servers is proposed by (Ceselli et al., 2005).
Their approach is based on the use of indexing infor-
mation which is attached to the encrypted database.
Many searchable encryption schemes such as (Boneh
et al., 2004), (Wang et al., 2010) lack query flexibil-
ity and/or use complicated cryptographic algorithms
which require high computational power. The high
computational cost may render outsourcing the data
collected by IPTV as an ineffective solution.
In our setting the advertiser performs queries on
a remote database of subscribers data (outsourced to
cloud server by IPTV) to find records matching with
the keywords in its queries. Using the responses to its
queries as input to its private strategy, the advertiser’s
goal to match viewers with relevant advertisements.
Keywords (conjunctive and otherwise) in queries are
needed to be encrypted to prevent the disclosure of
private strategy of advertiser to the cloud server, to
other advertisers and perhaps to IPTV itself. Thus,
the advertiser needs to query an encrypted database
using encrypted keywords. The core challenge we
address in this paper is to facilitate this efficiently in
the context of a practical privacy-preserving scheme,
whereby authorized advertisers can send personalized
advertisements to subscribers.
The proposed scheme is different from the previ-
ous works on the same subject, in which the IPTV op-
erator (i.e. the owner of the database) is also in charge
of processing the data and selecting the best adver-
tisements for the subscribers. Naturally, in that set-
ting the privacy of the subscribers is not a major con-
cern. However, in our case the data is outsourced to
the cloud which is honest but curious (i.e. the server
does not modify the message content and flow, but
may analyze them to infer additional information);
consequently the privacy of users must be protected.
The benefits of the proposed scheme are multifold: i)
the IPTV is partially relieved of management cost and
processing of data, ii) advertiser’s mining techniques
are not exposed to the cloud server, iii) data mining
required for targeted advertising can be performed by
advertising agencies, which have the relevant exper-
tise and tools, and iv) the IPTV can generate addi-
tional revenue from subscribers’ data by ensuring suf-
ficient data-protection safeguards in comply with rel-
evant legislations1. The scheme is also useful when
the advertiser is a division within the IPTV (e.g., pri-
vate cloud). In this case, the IPTV has robust data
protection practices in accordance with the relevant
legislations. That is, the IPTV keeps sensitive data
in encrypted form; data used for targeted advertise-
ment includes only necessary, anonymized informa-
tion about the subscribers; and access control to data
can be exercised in a fine-grained manner.
1Current legislations usually stipulate users’ consent and
proper data protection techniques such as encryption and
anonymization before disclosure and/or processing.
2 RELATED WORK
As mentioned in the previous section, sensitive data
has to be encrypted before outsourcing it to protect
data privacy. However, data encryption hinders tradi-
tional data utilization techniques based on plaintext
keyword search. Considering the large number of
users and documents in the cloud server, it is crucial
for the search service to facilitate fast and efficient
multi-keyword queries2. Many searchable encryption
schemes focus on a single keyword search. Wang et
al. (Wang et al., 2010) provide ranked keyword search
over encrypted cloud data. In their method the server
knows the relevance order of documents containing
specific keyword; however, it is limited to single key-
word search queries. In the public key setting, Boneh
et al. (Boneh et al., 2004) present the first searchable
encryption construction using public key cryptosys-
tem to perform search on encrypted data. Several
works on multi-keyword search were proposed (Cao
et al., 2011), (Boneh and Waters, 2007), (Ballard
et al., 2005), (Shen et al., 2009) that enable conjunc-
tive and disjunctive search options, but these schemes
incur large overhead in computation and/or commu-
nication costs.
An efficient scheme for conjunctive keyword-
based search is proposed by Wang et al. (Wang et al.,
2009). A searchable index is generated for each doc-
ument, which contains all the keywords in the docu-
ment. They use cryptographic hash function to obtain
indexes and trapdoors that allow secure searching for
keywords in indexes.
In our solution we adopt the scheme by Wang et
al. (Wang et al., 2009) utilizing a keyed hash func-
tion (HMAC) to map keywords in a subscriber’s data
to a sequence of r-bit index using a secret key known
only to the data owner. A similar approach is used in
(O¨rencik and Savas¸, 2012) for multi-keyword search
on encrypted data. Advertisers must, in advance, ob-
tain so-called secure trapdoors from the data owner
which enable to search for corresponding keywords
in subscribers data. Since those trapdoors are gener-
ated using the data owner’s secret key, the server is
not able to learn any information about the keywords
in the advertiser query.
In our scenario, the cloud server is in charge of
processing queries and sending results back to the
advertiser. The proposed solution is unique in the
sense that it protects the privacy of both subscribers
and advertisers as well as the IPTV business interests.
The proposed solution addresses the relevant security
2Multi-keyword (or multi-predicate) queries are essen-
tial to find database entries that are relevant to all keywords
in the query.
and privacy requirements of interactive TV (el Diehn
et al., 2011) which are also applicable in our scenario.
In the following section we provide the motivation for
the adopted model.
3 MOTIVATION
Since we aim to place subscribers’ data on a cloud
we need to anonymize it. One particular anonymiza-
tion technique would cluster the subscribers having
sufficiently close demographics and watching traits.
Then cluster representatives would be placed in the
cloud, whereby the advertisers utilized this summary
data to match the relevant subscribers with their ad-
vertisement portfolio. This technique is similar to the
k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) algorithm, but not the
best in our application scenario for the following rea-
sons: i) clustering leaks the information of some sub-
scribers, ii) the advertisers have to use static clusters
formed by the IPTV, iii) IPTV cannot control who ac-
cess/utilize the data, and iv) loss of accuracy. Since
leaking subscribers information is the most damaging
problem from privacy perspective, more robust solu-
tions are needed. We propose one such solution in the
remainder of this work.
4 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
The goal is to send targeted advertisements to view-
ers. We begin by describing the entities in our system
and their goal and knowledge.
4.1 Entities
There are three entities in our system:
Data owner.3 Data owner also called IPTV, is an en-
tity that provides content to viewers. It collects in-
formation about viewers’ demographics and weekly
watching habits, which is stored in a database. Each
individualized entry, called viewer profile, is consid-
ered private information. However, statistical aggre-
gation of viewer profiles can be released as long as in-
dividual entries cannot be recovered from the released
information. To increase profit the data owner is will-
ing to sell any type of information which does not vi-
olate the privacy of individual viewers. Furthermore,
the data owner aims to reduce management costs by
outsourcing to third parties database storage, backup
3In fact, the regulations state that the owner of an entry
is the person whom the entry is about. We use the term data
owner for IPTV in the sense it is the owner of the database.
and maintenance. Outsourcing is considered informa-
tion release and therefore should conform to privacy
restriction.
Advertiser (ADV). Advertisers are entities that gen-
erate targeted advertisements based on viewer demo-
graphics and watching habits. Advertisements are
generated based on a private advertiser strategy (e.g.,
data mining rules/techniques) that requires as input
information about target viewers. Therefore, the ad-
vertiser is willing to purchase access to any database
containing viewer profiles such as a database gener-
ated by the IPTV. Since mining rules can reveal infor-
mation about advertiser strategy, the advertiser wants
to keep those rules secret.
Server. A server is a professional entity (e.g. cloud
server, CS for short) that offers computing and stor-
age services to any party according to specifications
provided by said party. The CS does not deviate from
the provided specification but curious to infer any in-
formation from the use of its services. We assume that
it is against the business interest of the CS to collude
with any entity against other entities. As such the CS
is what is known as “honest but curious” entity.
4.2 Framework of Interaction
The general framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
The IPTV provides personalized program contents to
Figure 1: General framework of directed advertising ser-
vice.
viewers and collects their information. To reduce
costs the IPTV is outsourcing its database manage-
ment to a cloud server. Since the cloud server is an
external entity, the database can only be outsourced
in a form which does not violate the privacy of in-
dividual viewers, for example after encryption. Fur-
thermore, the cloud server should not be able to per-
form useful mining queries without IPTV assistance
and permission. Any prior IPTV assistance should be
useful only to the designated entities. Furthermore,
designated entities (advertisers) should not be able to
combine responses to queries to infer any informa-
tion that identifies individuals or link them to another
database. This necessitates applying anonymization
and generalization to the database before encryption.
The advertiser purchases access to the database
stored on the cloud server. To perform mining the ad-
vertiser may require assistance from the IPTV. In our
solution the database is stored encrypted on the cloud
server and therefore the advertiser needs in advance
certain trapdoor information generated by the IPTV;
the trapdoor information should not be transferable.
In addition, since the advertiser considers its mining
rules trades secret, the cloud server should not be able
to infer any information about advertiser’s queries.
The cloud server in advance obtains protocol spec-
ification from the IPTV and according to them ser-
vices requests from authorized entities. Throughout
these interactions the CS does not collude with any
entity to violate another entity’s secret or private in-
formation. Furthermore, it does not deviate from the
provided specifications.
5 CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we provide details of our solution.
5.1 Data Model
We consider a scenario where the profile of each sub-
scriber consists of seven demographic features and
eleven watching preferences without loss of gener-
ality. The demographic features are age, gender,
marital status, education, occupation, city, and loca-
tion, whose values are the keywords in our scheme.
Morning watching preferences are marriage, news,
and health programs. Similarly afternoon watching
preferences are marriage, TV series, and sport pro-
grams, while prime-time watching preferences are
news, competition, series, talk show, and sport pro-
grams4. Each watching preference is also taken as a
keyword in the proposed solution.
Our synthetic demographic profiles are assigned
randomly within the predefined categories (e.g. mar-
ried, single, widow, or divorced for ”marital status”)
and watching habits are calculated according to these
demographic features. The value for a watched pro-
gram is a real number in [0,1] indicating the rate of
time the subscriber spends on watching the program
during a week; the sum of these numbers for each
week and for each viewer must not exceed one. To
provide ranked search, i.e., how much the retrieved
profiles are relevant to the query, we use the relation
4Afternoon sport and prime time sport programs are in-
dependent fields.
Table 1: Rate table for watching habit features.
Rate of watch Rank Level
0 not watched 0
> 0 Seldom 1
>= 0.15 Average 2
>= 0.30 Frequent 3
described in Table 1. For example the value 0.5 that
appears in a viewer profile under prime time news im-
plies that the viewer under consideration is frequently
watching such program.
We also speculate that watching habits of indi-
viduals are correlated to their demographic features.
Therefore, any synthetic data should take into account
such dependencies. We use our custom-made data
generator which uses probabilistic selection process.
The process conforms to some simple expectations
about the types of correlations that exist between de-
mographic features and watching preferences. These
rules are not rigid and do not impose any restriction on
our proposed solution. Furthermore, the demographic
features and watching preferences can be modified
and extended to real world scenarios.
5.2 Index Generation
The actual solution is based on the construction pro-
posed by Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2009). The main
idea is to represent each database record as a binary
string referred as index. To accommodate n-ranked
search each record is expanded to n indexes. Without
loss of generality following Table 1 there are three
ranks “seldom”, “average”, and “frequent” according
to the rate given to each program per week.
Subsequently index for each database record is
cloned three times, once for each level. Each clone
contains the same demographic information but in-
cludes a given program field only if the correspond-
ing numerical value in the original record is non zero
and exceed the rate of watch lower bound as in Ta-
ble 1. We will describe how to generate the indexes
corresponding to rank one, others are generated in an
analogous way. Firstly, the IPTV selects an HMAC
(Hash-based Message Authentication Code) key. This
key is updated for each novel data sent to the cloud
server. With m we bound the maximum number of
fields in each profile, from now on we call these fields
keywords and each database record a profile. A pro-
file may have less that m keywords.
Suppose a given profile at a given rank contains
keywords {w1, . . . ,wn}, where n ≤ m. To generate
the corresponding rank binary string (index) the IPTV
computes the l-bit HMAC hi of each keyword wi
(HMAC: {0,1}∗→{0,1}l). Let
hi = hr−1i , . . . ,h
1
i ,h
0
i (1)
be the base 2d representation of hi (l = rd). From hi
for each keyword wi IPTV computes a binary string
(keyword trapdoor) Ii
Ii = (Ir−1i , . . . , I
j
i , . . . , I
1
i , I
0
i ), (2)
where
I ji =
{
0 if h ji = 0
1 otherwise
(3)
the index for the given profile at the given rank is
I =ni=1Ii, (4)
where  denotes bitwise product.
The IPTV sends to the cloud server records which
have the form
(pid , Iseldom, Iaverage, I f requent),
where Irank is the index of the viewer profile at rank
rank and pid is an anonymized pseudonym for a
viewer.
5.3 Query Index Generation and
Oblivious Search on the Database
An advertiser can purchase from the IPTV any sub-
set of keywords associated with database entries and
corresponding trapdoors. In the selected index gener-
ation scheme, multi-keyword (a.k.a. conjunctive key-
words) queries can be efficiently constructed, result-
ing in an r-bit binary sequence independent of the
number of keywords in the query. A multi-keyword
query index of keywords, w1, . . . ,wδ, is the bitwise
product of the corresponding trapdoors
Iq =δi=1Ii = qr−1 . . .q0.
A query from the advertiser to the cloud server is
such r-bit binary sequence known as query index and
search is done only by r-bit comparisons. The server
response is a list of pid such that each pid’s field in
the response I matches the query index Iq. We say
that I = jr−1 . . . j0 matches Iq = qr−1 . . .q0 if
∀i ∈ [0, . . . ,r−1],qi = 0⇒ ji = 0. (5)
In case of disjunctive query separate response is
generated for each keyword in the query, which needs
to be combined with others by appropriate operations
such as union, subtraction, etc.
Responses are returned rank wise for the records,
that is for seldom, average, and frequent ranks, the
cloud server returns separate anonymized id list.
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Figure 2: False Accept Rates(d=5, index=448 bits).
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Figure 3: False Accept Rates(d=6, index=784 bits).
To prevent an advertiser from selling its trapdoors
to other parties (or using other parties trapdoors in its
queries), trapdoor non-transferability protocol, given
in Appendix is designed. This protocol stipulates that
the advertiser submit a proof of ownership for the
trapdoors in its queries. Although relatively expen-
sive, the signature verification part of this protocol,
which dominates its timing, is executed once after the
purchase of trapdoors.
5.4 False Accept Rates
The indexing method that we employ covers all the in-
formation on keywords in a single r-bit index file. In-
dependent from the hash function, after reduction and
bitwise product operation there is a possibility that in-
dex of a query may wrongly match with an irrelevant
profile, which is called False Accept Rate (FAR for
short). The system is free from false rejects, meaning
if a profile contains all of the keywords in the query,
that profile will definitely be a match to the query. The
FAR is calculated as:
number o f incorrect matches
number o f all matches
.
In Figure 2 we compare the false accept rates of
queries containing two, three, four, and five keywords
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Figure 4: False Accept Rates(d=6, index=1040 bits).
for the profiles having 18, 28,. . . , 48 keywords where
index size (r) is 480 bits. The false accept rates in-
crease rapidly after 38 keywords per profile since the
number of zeros in the index file increase.
To obtain a better intuition we extend our experi-
ment to test the relationship between the parameters.
If more keywords are required per profile, false ac-
cept rates can be reduced by increasing the index size
(i.e. choosing a longer HMAC function) and choosing
larger base 2d . The false accept rates given in Figure
3 and 4 are calculated for 784-bit and 1040-bit index
lengths when d = 6. We observe that the false accept
rates decrease significantly in comparison to the rates
in Figure 2.
Having 1040-bit index and d = 6 leads to the low-
est false accept rate as illustrated in Figure 4. More
keywords in profiles leads to more zeros in the in-
dex for profiles, therefore a higher chance of matching
these profiles incorrectly. We observe a similar trend
for the multi-keyword queries, where more trapdoors
in a query tend to increase the false accept rates. In
any case, acceptably low false accept rates can always
be achieved by increasing the index length and using
larger base 2d .
In our system the possibility of false accept and
false reject rates are zero due to the number of key-
words per profile is low.
6 PRIVACY ARGUMENTS
In this section, we show how the proposed scheme
addresses the privacy requirements in our setting. We
assume that the database schema (i.e. keywords and
their values) is known information and that the ad-
versary does not know the mapping between the key-
words and trapdoors. We further assume that the sta-
tistical model of the database is initially known only
by the data owner.
6.1 Data and Query Privacy
We argue that the encrypted index does not leak use-
ful information about subscribers profile. Our scheme
substitute the hash function of Wang et al. (Wang
et al., 2009) with a keyed HMAC function. Follow-
ing (Wang et al., 2009, Theorem 1) a polynomially
bounded adversary can only learn trivial information
about the data entries from the index published on the
cloud server.
The underlying HMAC function protects the
users’ profiles against unauthorized access. To re-
cover the complete information given only an index
value a polynomial time adversary A needs to per-
form an exhaustive search on all possible HMAC
keys. This is true both for database and query indexes.
With the current technology for 128-bit random key
no adversary can reconstruct the user profile.
6.2 Unlinkability
A privacy-preserving targeted advertising scheme is
said to provide unlinkability for queries if it prevents
an adversary from linking two queries consisting of
identical set of keywords.
We argue that an advertiser has hardly any reason
to send the same query twice to the same database.
Given HMAC tags for two different messages (key-
words) that are not related an adversary can only learn
that a set of keywords in a given query are the subset
of the keywords in another query by comparing the
position of zeros similar to Equation 5.
Updating the HMAC key for each novel data sent
to the CS causes trapdoors and all the records in the
cloud to be changed. Unless there is a weakness in
HMAC key whereby, given two HMAC outputs for
the same messages under different keys are related,
queries to different databases cannot be linked. Sim-
ilarly the values contained in different databases can-
not be associated with each others.
6.3 Preventing Unauthorized Access
The trapdoor non-transferability protocol in Ap-
pendix prevents advertisers utilizing unauthorized
trapdoors in their queries. The index in IPTV sig-
nature allows the CS to identify if the keywords in
a given query were indeed purchased by the adver-
tiser. This prevents an advertiser from querying the
database with the keyword s/he did not purchase. Fur-
thermore, the advertiser id in the IPTV signature al-
lows the CS to identify which advertiser purchased
the access to the database. The encryption the CS uses
Table 2: Notations.
N number of profiles
n number of keywords in each profile for the given rank
t number of purchased keywords by an advertiser
δ number of keywords in a (multi-keyword) query
β number of profiles matched with the query
α number of nominated ids for a specific advertisement
r size of an index
h hash digest length
η number of rank levels
l hash digest length
prevents an advertiser A from selling keywords to an-
other advertiser B. Indeed if advertiser B purchases
keywords from the advertiser A rather than the IPTV
then either advertiser B has to reveal its query to ad-
vertiser A or advertiser A has to give its private key to
advertiser B. In either case one of the advertisers may
be leaking some non-trivial information about their
advertising strategies via their queries to a competitor.
Thus advertisers have no incentives to collude against
the IPTV.
Since the CS’s response is encrypted using the
advertiser’s public key only the designated adver-
tiser learns the information transfered. Therefore the
strategies used by various advertisers are hidden from
each other.
7 COMPLEXITY
In this section, we evaluate the complexity of the pro-
posed technique. The communication and compu-
tational costs are analyzed separately. We give the
adopted notation in the Table 2. The parameter values
should be selected based on real data, which at the
present is not available to us. The performance eval-
uation presented here only serves to provide intuition
for the possible incurred cost.
7.1 Communication Costs
Communication costs are given on basis of interac-
tions between the participants in Table 3. Values in-
side the brackets should be taken into account when
the trapdoor non-transferability protocol in Appendix
is used where the RSA modulus is 1024 bits.
• Data Owner-Server communication. The data
owner sends profile indexes to the server periodi-
cally (e.g. weekly), which is Nr bits or Nrη bits
in case η levels are used for ranking.
• Data Owner-Advertiser communication.
The data owner sends the trapdoors for the pur-
chased keywords to the advertiser. This commu-
Table 3: Communication costs incurred by each party in the
proposed system.
Communication cost (bit)
Data owner-server Nr
Nrη (η ranking)
Data owner-advertiser tr+[1024+r]
Advertiser-data owner 32α+advertisement
Advertiser-server r+[1024+ r]
Server-advertiser response+[1024]
nication is performed again if the advertiser pur-
chases a new keyword or if the secret key of the
data owner is changed.
The advertiser sends nominated ids and advertise-
ment to the data owner. Therefore, the advertiser
sends 32α bits to the data owner assuming that
each id is a 32-bit integer, plus the content of the
advertisement.
• Advertiser-Server communication. The adver-
tiser sends an r-bit query index to the server. The
server sends only an anonymized id list as a re-
sponse to the advertiser. When ranking is used η
lists are sent.
7.2 Computational costs
Following are the computational costs for each party
in the system.
• Data Owner. Creates profile indexes periodically.
• Advertiser. Only prepares an index for a query
which involves bitwise product of trapdoors cor-
responding to keywords in a conjunctive query.
• Server. Performs search operation, which is basi-
cally r-bit binary comparisons of query indexes
with the database entries. If ranking is used,
the server performs at most η-1 additional binary
comparisons for each matching profile.
Computational costs are summarized in Table 4. Val-
ues inside the brackets should be taken into account
when the trapdoor non-transferability protocol in Ap-
pendix is used where the RSA modulus is 1024 bits..
7.3 Timing Results for Simple
Multi-keyword Queries
In this section, we perform experiments for the
scenario where the advertiser sends multi-keyword
queries to find subscribers of matching profiles for an
advertisement.
The proposed system is implemented and tested
on a Windows 7 machine with Intel Xeon 6 Core
running at 3.2 GHz. Our experiments are carried on
Table 4: Computational costs incurred by each party in the
proposed system.
Computational costs (bit)
Data Owner ∑ j=Nj=1 ∑
i=η
i=1 (n×h-bit hash+n bitwise product of
r-bit string).
[for each advertiser:
t×(h-bit hash)+t bitwise products of r-bit trapdoors.
1024-bit RSA signature.]
Advertiser r bitwise products of δ trapdoors (conjunctive query)
[1024-bit RSA signature verification.
To get response:
RSA decryption of the symmetric key and
symmetric decryption of the response.]
[1024-bit RSA signature verification.
r binary comparisons.]
(without ranking)
N× r binary comparisons.
Server (with ranking)
N× r+(η−1)×β× r binary comparisons.
One RSA Encryption of responses.
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Figure 5: Timings for index construction with 18 keywords
per profile (on data owner side).
custom-made synthetic database. In the experiments,
the HMAC function produces 300 bytes output, which
is generated by concatenating different length SHA2-
based HMAC functions. We choose d = 5, so after
reduction the index size (r) is 60 bytes (480 bits). The
database has different number of subscribers varying
from 5,000 to 80,000 with each profile having at most
18 keywords.
Timing results for operations on data owner side
are presented in Figure 5. Since these operations are
performed periodically (e.g. weekly) and index cal-
culation can be parallelized, the presented technique
is practical and efficient from the data owner perspec-
tive. Timing results for index generation with par-
allelization utilizing all six-cores in the platform are
illustrated by dashed lines in Figure 5.
Timing results on the server side for the search
operation with and without ranking indicate relatively
low latency as shown in Figure 6. Timings for query
search when using the trapdoor non-transferability
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Figure 6: Timings for query search with and without rank-
ing (on the cloud server side).
protocol are also illustrated by dashed lines in Fig-
ure 6, which is again relatively low. Note that the sig-
nature verification in the protocol, which dominates
the timing, does not have to be performed every time.
Therefore, the scheme is efficient from cloud server
perspective. Query construct by the advertiser takes
negligible amount of time and therefore omitted here.
7.4 Timing Results for Data Mining
Algorithms
We performed two experiments to demonstrate the ef-
ficiency of the two most common data mining algo-
rithms in our setting, namely clustering and content-
based filtering. The same implementation on the same
platform as in Section 7.3 are used in these experi-
ments.
7.4.1 Experiment 1: Clustering
Advertising agencies can use demographic filter-
ing (Aı¨meur et al., 2008) to categorize subscribers
based on their demographics and send advertisements
accordingly. Since there are seven demographic fea-
tures in our data model and total number of keywords
pertaining to the demographic features is 42 the ad-
vertising agency sends a total of 42 different (single-
keyword) queries to obtain information about view-
ers’ demographics. Then the agency can utilize the
results of queries to generate a relevant viewers’ seg-
mentation for his advertising purpose. This experi-
ment is implemented using reliable socket communi-
cation (i.e. TCP) in the same computer.
The timing results are enumerated in Table 5 for
different number of subscribers, where the second
column lists the total elapsed time for the advertiser
while the third column indicates the time cloud server
spends during the entire process. The last column
shows the time spent on the communication. Note
Table 5: Timing results for obtaining the entire demo-
graphic data used in clustering based on demographics.
Number of Advertiser Cloud Server - Communication
profiles total time Query search time (ms)
(ms) time (ms)
5,000 164 58 106
10,000 422 112 310
20,000 656 219 437
40,000 1,345 451 894
80,000 2.639 1,185 1,454
that the time spent for actual clustering algorithm is
not reported here.
7.4.2 Experiment 2: Content-Based Filtering
The advertising agency can use content-based filter-
ing (Aı¨meur et al., 2008) to send its advertisements
to related subscribers. Each advertisement can be de-
scribed by some attributes or characteristics. Adver-
tiser uses a similarity metric between the advertise-
ment attributes and viewers demographics and watch-
ing habits to predict viewers’ potential interests in a
specific advertisement. The similarity S can be de-
fined as a number in the interval [0,1]. If the ad-
vertisement c has non-zero similarity to viewers de-
mographics and watching habits (a1,a2, . . . ,aσ), i.e.
S(ai,c) 6= 0, then the prediction for the interest of a
subscriber s on advertisement c is computed as
Pc,s =
∑σi=1 vs,ai ·S(ai,c)
∑σi=1 S(ai,c)
, (6)
where vs,ai is the relevancy score of the subscriber s
to the query containing attribute ai. If the subscriber
is not a match for a query, then his score will be zero.
As an example, suppose that an advertisement
for a shaving blade brand will be sent to viewers
who are male, leading active life styles and inter-
ested in sports. We can define non-zero similarities
of the advertisement to the following demographics
and watching habits: (male, news-morning, news-
primetime, sport-afternoon, sport-primetime). The
advertiser can send five different queries to the cloud
server and calculate a prediction for matching sub-
scribers using the rates showing the relevancy scores
of the subscribers (i.e. vs,ai ) to the query. The adver-
tiser can specify a threshold τ for the advertisement,
whereby a subscriber will become a nominate (target)
for the advertisement if the prediction for the sub-
scriber is greater than τ. Timings for the advertiser to
compute predictions for the advertisement described
by five attributes are 15 ms, 40 ms, 207 ms, 599 ms,
2,249 ms for number of profiles 5000, 10000, 20000,
40000, 80000, respectively.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
We propose a practical solution for secure and
privacy-preserving targeted advertising service for
IPTV subscribers utilizing cloud computing. While
the privacy of subscribers is protected, the advertiser
agencies can target their advertisements to prospec-
tive customers with high precision since the false ac-
cept and reject rates can be made practically zero.
Also by utilizing the rating mechanism adopted in our
solution, the advertiser can select only viewers who
demonstrate desired relevance to its queries. Further-
more, advertising agencies have another incentive to
use the proposed system due to the fact that their pri-
vate strategies in reaching potential customers are not
exposed to cloud server and other advertisers.
From the IPTV’s perspective, the proposed system
has many advantages. It allows outsourcing all the
services pertaining to advertisement without any ad-
verse effect on security and privacy issues concerning
its subscribers. Furthermore, advertisers (or any other
party who has access to the database on the cloud)
can utilize the data only if they are authorized to do
so. The IPTV can control the access to the database
in fine grained manner in the sense that the advertiser
can only access to the part of the database related to
keywords, for which it holds trapdoors.
The proposed method supports efficient conjunc-
tive queries and single-keyword queries. As future
work, we will develop an efficient system that acceler-
ates complex queries, which combine many keywords
in different forms such as (keyword1 OR keyword2
NOT keyword3). Also, the proposed system consid-
ers the entire household as single individual while, in
reality it usually consists of individuals with different
profiles (e.g. children, young individuals, adults). A
future system should represent a household with more
than one profile to send relevant advertisements at the
right time, which is necessary to find the best targets
for an advertisement.
We will strengthen the security and privacy of the
proposed system to prevent leakage for the applica-
tions where cloud server has some knowledge about
the statistical model of the database. This is espe-
cially important where the responses to given queries
conform to the statistical model.
As a first step before extending this work we plan
to introduce formal definitions and arguments that
justifies the soundness of our solutions.
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APPENDIX
Trapdoor Non-transferability Protocol
This protocol is designed to prevent authorized adver-
tisers selling their trapdoors to each other. Public keys
of the participants:
PUX - public key of the party X
PRX - private key of the party X
Assume that an advertiser (ADV) purchases the fol-
lowing trapdoors (I1, I2, . . . , It) corresponding to the
keywords (w1,w2, . . . ,wt)
IPTV performs the following steps:
1. Computes I =ti=1Ii.
2. Generates the signature for the sold trapdoors
S = SIGNPRIPTV (I,PUADV ) .
3. Sends (S, I) to ADV.
The advertiser validates the signature S. For a query
that involves the keywords {w1,w2, . . . ,wδ}, the ad-
vertiser and the cloud server execute the following
protocol steps:
1. ADV compute Iq =δi=1Ii.
2. ADV sends (I,S), and Iq to CS.
3. CS continues if the signature is verified.
4. For I = jr−1 . . . j0 and Iq = qr−1 . . .q0 CS checks
∀i ∈ [0, . . . ,r−1],qi = 0⇒ ji = 0.
If Iq matches with I, meaning that ADV is autho-
rized to ask such query, otherwise it aborts.
5. CS performs the query and generates a response
R, which includes the list of ids matching the
predicates in the query.
6. CS selects a symmetric key k and performs
the following encryptions ENCPUADV (k) and
ENCk(R). Next he sends ciphertexts to ADV.
7. ADV decrypts ENCPUADV (k) with its private key
and obtains k. Knowing the symmetric key, the
advertiser can obtain the response.
